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Abstract— By taking a variety of realistic hardware imperfec-
tions into consideration, we propose an optimal power alloca-
tion (OPA) strategy to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rate
of a cooperative wireless network comprised of a source, a desti-
nation, and an untrusted amplify-and-forward relay. We assume
that either the source or the destination is equipped with a large-
scale multiple antennas’ system, while the rest are equipped with
a single antenna. To prevent the untrusted relay from intercepting
the source message, the destination sends an intended jamming
noise to the relay, which is referred to as destination-based
cooperative jamming. Given this system model, novel closed-form
expressions are presented in the high signal-to-noise ratio regime
for the ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability.
We further improve the secrecy performance of the system by
optimizing the associated hardware design. The results reveal that
by beneficially distributing the tolerable hardware imperfections
across the transmission and reception radio-frequency front ends
of each node, the system’s secrecy rate may be improved. The
engineering insight is that equally sharing the total imperfections
at the relay between the transmitter and the receiver provides
the best secrecy performance. Numerical results illustrate that
the proposed OPA together with the most appropriate hardware
design significantly increases the secrecy rate.
Index Terms— Physical layer security, untrusted relay, hard-
ware imperfections, optimal power allocation, hardware design.
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURITY in wireless communication networks isconventionally implemented above the physical layer
using key based cryptography [1]. To complement these
highly complex schemes, wireless transmitters can also be
validated at the physical layer by exploiting the dynamic
characteristics of the associated communication links [2], [3].
Physical layer security (PLS) is a promising paradigm for
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safeguarding fifth-generation (5G) wireless communication
networks without incurring additional security overhead [3].
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems as
a key enabling technology of 5G wireless communication
networks provide significant performance gains in terms of
spectral efficiency and energy efficiency [4], [5]. This new
technology employs coherent processing across arrays of
hundreds or even thousands of base station (BS) antennas
and supports tens or hundreds of mobile terminals [4], [5].
As an additional advantage, massive MIMO is inherently
more secure than traditional MIMO systems, as the large-scale
antenna array exploited at the transmitter can precisely aim a
narrow and directional information beam towards the intended
receiver, such that the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is
several orders of magnitude higher than that at any incoherent
passive eavesdropper [6]. However, these security benefits are
severely hampered in cooperative networks where the intended
receivers may also be potential eavesdroppers [7], [8].
In the context of PLS, cooperative jamming which involves
the transmission of additional jamming signals to degrade the
received SNR at the potential eavesdropper can be applied by
source [8], the intended receiver node [7], a relay [9], [10]
or a set of nodes, i.e., source and destination or source
and relay to beamform the jamming noise orthogonal to
the spatial dimension of the desired signal [2]. Recently,
several works have considered the more interesting scenario of
untrusted relaying [11]–[19] where the cooperative jamming
is performed by the intended receiver, which is referred to as
destination-based cooperative jamming (DBCJ).
In real life, an untrusted, i.e., honest-but-curious, relay
may collaborate to provide a reliable communication. Several
practical scenarios may include untrusted relay nodes, e.g.,
in ultra-dense heterogeneous wireless networks where low-
cost intermediate nodes may be used to assist the source-
destination transmission. In these networks, it is important
to protect the confidentiality of information from the untrust-
worthy relay, while concurrently relying on it to increase the
reliability of communication. Thanks to the DBCJ strategy [7],
positive secrecy rate can still be attained in untrusted relay
networks. In recent years, several works have focused on the
performance analysis [11], [12], power allocation [13]–[18]
and security enhancement [15], [19] of untrusted relaying
networks. To be specific, the authors in [13]–[15] studied
the optimal power allocation (OPA) strategy to maximize the
instantaneous secrecy rate of one-way relaying network while
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two-way relaying scenario was considered in [16] and [17].
The OPA problem with imperfect channel state information
was investigated in [18]. Notably, all the aforementioned
works considered perfect hardware in the communication
network.
In practice, hardware equipments suffer from detrimental
impacts of I/Q imbalance, phase noise, amplifier nonlinearities,
quantization errors, non-ideal filters, etc. [20]–[27]. These
unavoidable imperfections are expected to be particularly pro-
nounced in massive MIMO systems as the very large number
of base station antennas makes the deployment of low-cost
elements desirable to keep the overall capital expenditures
for operators manageable. Technically, the severity of the
imperfections depends on the quality of the hardware used
in the radio-frequency (RF) transceivers. Although hardware
imperfections can be mitigated by analog and digital signal
processing methods [20], they cannot be removed completely,
due to the randomness introduced by the different sources of
imperfections. This is because, for example, inaccurate models
adopted to characterize the imperfections’ behavior, imperfect
parameters for estimation errors due to thermal noise, and
unsophisticated compensation algorithms with limited capabil-
ities. The remaining residual transceiver imperfections can be
modeled by a combination of multiplicative phase noise and
additive distortion noises at the transmitter and the receiver
[20], [27], [28]. In this paper, our analysis focuses on the effect
of the residual additive hardware imperfection as stated in most
of the literature [25]–[27], while the study of phase noise is
left for future work. It is worth noting that the adoption of
the additive model for the imperfection is based on its analyt-
ical tractability and the experimental verifications [21], [26].
Regarding the results in [20], the detrimental impact of hard-
ware imperfections is more challenging especially in high rate
systems such as LTE-Advanced and 5G networks exploiting
inexpensive equipments. Although most contributions in secu-
rity based wireless networks have assumed perfect transceiver
hardware [7]–[19], or only investigated the impact of particular
imperfections such as I/Q imbalance [22] or phase noise
[23], [24] in the presence of an external eavesdropper, this
paper goes beyond these investigations by considering residual
hardware imperfections in PLS design.
In this paper, we take into account the OPA and hardware
design in a two-hop amplify-and-forward (AF) untrusted relay
network where all the nodes suffer from hardware imperfec-
tions and either the source or the destination is equipped with
large-scale multiple antennas (LSMA) [4], [13], [28] while
the other nodes are equipped with a single-antenna. We note
that the network optimization including, both the OPA and
hardware design, can be applied for any number of antennas
at the source, relay and destination. However, in this paper,
to facilitate analysis and gather deeper insights into the net-
work performance, we adopt an LSMA approach. As will be
observed in numerical examples, the analysis are still valid for
moderate number of antennas. The DBCJ protocol is operated
in the first phase and then the destination perfectly removes the
jamming signal via self-interference cancelation in the second
phase. For this system model, the main contributions of the
paper are summarized as follows:
• Inspired by [20], [21], and [25], we first present the gen-
eralized system model for transceiver hardware imperfec-
tions in our secure transmission network. Based on this,
we calculate the received instantaneous signal-to-noise-
plus-distortion-ratio (SNDR) at the relay and destination.
• We formulate the OPA between the source and destination
that maximizes the instantaneous secrecy rate of untrusted
relaying. Accordingly, novel closed-form solutions are
derived for the exact OPA. In addition, new simple
solutions are derived for the OPA in the high SNR regime.
• According to our OPA solutions, novel compact expres-
sions are derived for the ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) and
secrecy outage probability (SOP) in the high signal-to-
noise-ratio (SNR) regime that can be applied to arbitrary
channel fading distributions. To gain further insights,
new closed-form expressions are presented over Rayleigh
fading channels. The asymptotic results highlight the
presence of a secrecy rate ceiling which is basically
different from the prefect hardware case. We highlight
that this ceiling phenomenon is independent of the fading
characteristic of the two hops.
• We provide new insights for hardware design in
DBCJ-based secure communications. To this end, under
the cost constraint of transceiver hardware at each node,
we formulate the hardware design problem for the afore-
mentioned network to maximize the secrecy rate. The
results reveal that the secrecy rate can be improved by
optimally distributing the level of hardware imperfections
between the transmit and receive radio frequency (RF)
front ends of each node.
Notation: We use bold lower case letters to denote vectors.
IN and 0N×1 denote the Identity matrix and the zeros matrix,
respectively. ‖.‖, (.)H and (.)T denote the Euclidean norm,
conjugate transpose and transpose operators, respectively;
Ex{·} stands for the expectation over the random variable (r.v.)
x; Pr(·) denotes the probability; fX(·) and FX(·) denote the
probability density function (pdf) and cumulative distribution
function (cdf) of the r.v. X , respectively; the CN (µ, σ2)
denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian RV with
mean µ and variance σ2; diag(A) stands for the main diag-
onal elements of matrix A; Ei(x) is the exponential integral
[29, eq. (8.211)]. [·]+ = max{0, x} and max stands for the
maximum value.
II. SIGNAL AND SYSTEM REPRESENTATION
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, the system model under consideration
is a wireless network with one source (S), one destination (D)
and one untrusted AF relay (R). While R and D are equipped
with one antenna, S is equipped with LSMA denoted by Ns
[10], [28]. This corresponds to the downlink (DL) scenario
in a cellular system where the base station is equipped with
an LSMA and the mobile user and relay are equipped with
a single-antenna. We note that the reverse scenario, i.e., the
uplink (UL) where a single-antenna S transmits to a multiple-
antenna D with Nd antennas can be handled using a similar
approach as the DL scenario. Therefore, we skip the detailed
4304 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 17, NO. 7, JULY 2018
Fig. 1. Secure transmission under the presence of transceiver imperfections
for downlink transmission. The relay acts as both helper and eavesdropper.
The solid lines represent the first phase of transmission while the dashed line
represents the second phase of transmission.
operational descriptions for the UL scenario and only briefly
state the results.
All the nodes operate in a half-duplex mode. Accordingly,
D cannot receive the transmitted signal from S while trans-
mitting the jamming signal and hence, the direct link between
S and D is unavailable. We also assume that the channels
satisfy the reciprocity theorem [7]. The complex Gaussian
channel from S to R and R to D are denoted by hsr ∼
CN (0Ns×1, µsrINs) and hrd ∼ CN (0, µrd), respectively.
We consider slow fading such that the channel coefficients
vary independently from one frame to another frame and, they
do not change within one frame. The additive white noise ni
(i ∈ {R,D}) at each receiver is represented by a zero-mean
complex Gaussian variable with variance N0. We define the
SNRs per link as γsr
∆=ρ‖hsr‖2 and γrd∆=ρ|hrd|2 and hence,
the average SNRs per branch is given by γsr = ρµsr and
γrd = ρµrd, where ρ = PN0 represents the transmit SNR of
the network. For signal transmission, the maximum ratio trans-
mission (MRT) beamforming is applied at the multi-antenna
node to improve the overall system performance [28]. We note
that in addition to the OPA, the choice of beamforming vector
has also impact on the achievable secrecy rate. Therefore,
it would be interesting to evaluate an optimal beamformer
following the approach mentioned in [30]. However, such
a choice of beamforming vector makes the derivation for
closed-form expression of ergodic secrecy rate intractable.
Therefore, in this paper, the MRT beamformer which has low
implementation complexity compared to more sophisticated
precoder designs is adopted at the multiple-antenna node [31].
It is worth mentioning that the MRT beamformer has been
severally exploited in the hardware impairment literature [23],
[24], [26], [27] for both performance analysis and network
optimization. We also adopt the maximal ratio combining
(MRC) processing at the multi-antenna receiver node. Let
ν = γsrγrd represent the ratio between the source-to-relay and
relay-to-destination SNRs. For the DL scenario, based on the
LSMA at the source together with the law of large numbers,
the source-to-relay link appears as a scalar proportional to the
number of source antennas Ns. Therefore, as considered in
the previous literature [13], [15], the r.v. ν is almost surely
much more than one. Notably the case of γsr  γrd is a
realistic scenario that occurs when the number of antennas at
the source is significantly large [4], [13]. This scenario also
occurs when the relay is located much closer to the source
compared to the destination [9], [10]. It is worth mentioning
that it is a common assumption where the source and relay
nodes to be considered as part of one cluster group, while
the destination and the possible eavesdroppers are placed in
another cluster group [9], [10]. As such, the distance between
the source and relay is much smaller than the distance between
the relay and destination. More specifically, this assumption is
especially appropriate for networks with broadcast and unicast
communication, where each terminal is a legitimate receiver
for one signal and may be considered as an eavesdropper for
some other signal [9]. Similar justifications can be presented
for the UL scenario with ν  1.
The DBCJ technique is applied to degrade the received
signal at the untrusted relay such that it cannot decipher
the desired information. The whole transmission is performed
based on a time-division multiple-access (TDMA) based pro-
tocol such that the message transmission is divided into
two phases, i.e. the broadcast phase and the relaying phase.
We consider a total transmit power budget for S and D of P
with power allocation factor λ ∈ (0, 1) such that the transmit
powers at S and D are λP and (1 − λ)P , respectively [13],
[16], [17]. As such, during the first phase, while S transmits
the intended signal with power λP , concurrently D jams with
a Gaussian noise to confuse the untrusted relay with power
(1− λ)P . For simplicity, the transmit power at R is set to P
and accordingly, in the second phase of transmission, R simply
broadcasts the amplified version of the received signal with
power of P .
In order to model the statistical behavior of the residual
hardware imperfection at node i, i ∈ {S,R,D}, the gener-
alized system model from [20] is taken into account. It is
worth noting that the experimental results conducted in [21]
and many theoretical investigations in [21] and [32] present
that the transmitted distortion noise can be well-modeled as a
Gaussian distributed random variable. For example, the model
used in [21] is validated using real-world measurements on
a 4-stream Tx-RF chain performed in a MIMO orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) scenario. While only
some of impairments, e.g., I/Q imbalance, etc., have been
reported to match well with Gaussian noise, the measure-
ment results in [21] for the MIMO-OFDM case indicate
that an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) additive
Gaussian noise model accurately describes the sum of all such
residual Tx-RF impairments. The detailed description of how
this model has been extracted has been completely described
in [21, Sec. VI.6]. Accordingly, denoting the imperfection at
transmission and reception segments by ηti and ηri , respec-
tively, we have [21]
ηtS ∼ CN
(
0,
λPktS
2
‖hsr‖2 diag(|hsr1 |
2 ... |hsrNs |2)
)
,
ηtD ∼ CN
(
0, (1− λ)PktD2
)
, ηrD ∼ CN
(
0, PkrD
2|hrd|2
)
.
(1)
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The imperfections at R are also given by
ηtR ∼ CN
(
0, PktR
2
)
,
ηrR ∼ CN
(
0, PkrR
2
[
λ‖hsr‖2 + (1− λ)‖hrd‖2
])
, (2)
where the design parameters kti , kri > 0 for i ∈ {S,R,D}
characterize the level of imperfections in the transmitter
and receiver hardware, respectively. These parameters can be
interpreted as the error vector magnitudes (EVMs). EVM
determines the quality of RF transceivers and is defined as
the ratio of the average distortion magnitude to the average
signal magnitude. Since the EVM measures the joint effect
of different hardware imperfections and compensation algo-
rithms, it can be measured directly in practice [20]. 3GPP LTE
has EVM requirements in the range of kti , kri ∈ [0.08, 0.175],
where smaller values are needed to achieve higher spectral
efficiencies [25].
Remark 1 (Co-Channel Interference): In this paper,
we adopt the additive Gaussian model to consider the hardware
imperfection. In typical wireless environments, large enough
number of interfering signals present in the communication
network. In such networks, the Gaussian assumption for the
interference is valid by applying the central limit theorem [33].
Therefore, we can merge the hardware imperfection and the
interfering signals to introduce an additive Gaussian noise with
a new variance obtained by summing the variances of the two
events.
B. Signal Representation
Let us denote xS and xD as the unit power information
signal and the jamming signal, respectively. According to the
combined impact of hardware imperfections which is well-
addressed by a generalized channel model [20], the received
signal at R can be expressed as
yR =
(√
λPwSxS + ηtS
T
)
hsr
+
(√
(1 − λ)PxD + ηtDT
)
hrd + ηrR + nR, (3)
where wS = hsr
H
‖hsr‖ represents the MRT transmit weight vector
at S. Observe from (3) that the propagated distortion noises
by S and D, and the self-distortion noise at R are treated as
interference at the untusted relay which is a potential eaves-
dropper. As a result, the engineering insight is to beneficially
forward these hardware imperfections to make the system
secure instead of injecting more artificial noise by S [8], [19],
D [11]–[15], [18] or an external jammer [9], [10], [16], [17].
Then the relay amplifies its received signal in the first phase
by an amplification factor of
G =
√
P
E|yR|2 =
√
ρ
AGλ + BG
, (4)
where AG = (γsr−γrd)(1+krR2)+ktS2γu−ktD2γv and BG =
γrd(1 + krR
2) + ktD
2
γv + 1 with γu = ρ
∑ |hsri |4/‖hsr‖2 and
γv = γrd. Then, the received signal at D after self-interference
(or jamming signal) cancelation is given by
yD = G
√
λPwHS hsrhrdxS︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information signal
+GhrdnR + nD︸ ︷︷ ︸
AWGN Noise
+ GηtS
T
hsrhrd+GηrRhrd+Gη
t
D
T
hrdhdr+ηtRhrd+η
r
D︸ ︷︷ ︸
Distortion noise
,
(5)
According to (3) and after some algebraic manipulations,
the SNDR at R is given by
γR =
λν
ARλ + BR
, (6)
where AR = krR
2ν + ktS
2 γu
γrd
− ktD2 γvγrd − krR
2 − 1 and
BR = 1 + krR
2 + ktD
2 γv
γrd
+ 1γrd . Furthermore, using (5),
the SNDR at D can be calculated as
γD =
λγsr
ADλ + BD
, (7)
where AD = (γsr − γrd)(krD2krR2 + krR2ktR2 + k2R + krD2) +
γu(krD
2ktS
2+ktR
2
ktS
2+ktS
2)+γv(krD
2ktD
2−ktR2ktD2−ktD2)+
(ν−1)(1+krR2)+ γuγrd ktS
2− γvγrd ktD
2
and BD = γrd(krR
2krD
2 +
krR
2ktR
2 + k2R + k
r
D
2) + γv(krD
2ktD
2 + ktR
2
ktD
2 + ktD
2) +
γv
γrd
ktD
2 + 1γrd + k
2
R + k
r
D
2 + 2. We define k2R
∆=ktR
2 + krR
2 and
k2D
∆=ktD
2 + krD
2 as the total imperfection level at R and D,
respectively.
Remark 2 (Perfect Hardware): The received SNRs at
R and D with perfect hardware were derived in [11] and [13].
When setting the level of imperfections at the nodes to zero,
the derived SNDRs in this section reduce to the special case
as follows [13]
γperfectR =
λγsr
(1− λ)γrd + 1 ,
γperfectD =
λγsrγrd
λγsr + (2− λ)γrd + 1 . (8)
As can be seen, the mathematical structure of the derived
SNDRs in (6), (7) are more complicated compared to the
perfect hardware case in (8), since the terms γuγrd and
γu
γrd
manifest in the denominator. As such, it is non-trivial to
propose an OPA solution for the general scenario of imperfect
hardware. This generalization is done in Section III and is a
main contribution of this work.
Based on the LSMA at S, (6) and (7) are simplified to
γR =
aLλ
λ + bL
and γD =
cLλ
λ + dL
, (9)
where
aL =
1
ξ1 − 1 , bL =
τ1
(ξ1 − 1)ν ,
cL =
γrd
τ2γrd + ξ1
and dL =
τ3γrd + τ4
ν(τ2γrd + ξ1)
, (10)
and, τ1 = 1+krR
2 +ktD
2
, τ2 = krD
2krR
2 +krR
2ktR
2 +k2R+k
r
D
2
,
τ3 = τ2 + ktD
2
krD
2 + ktR
2
ktD
2 + ktD
2
, τ4 = 2 + k2R + k
2
D
and ξ1 = 1 + krR
2
. Based on (9), we can conclude that
although the intercept probability is reduced by increasing
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the imperfection at R, the secrecy rate is also degraded.
It is, therefore, of great interest to intelligently distribute
the tolerable hardware imperfections across the transmission
and reception radio frequency (RF) front ends of R (and
other nodes) to improve the secrecy rate of the network. The
hardware design problem is analyzed in Section VI and is a
main contribution of this paper.
III. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
This section proceeds to analyze the optimal power alloca-
tion problem with the aim of maximizing the instantaneous
secrecy rate. Extending the results in [13], [14], and [18],
where the OPA was solved for perfect hardware, we investigate
the power allocation factor λ under the presence of hardware
imperfections. To do so, the instantaneous secrecy rate is
evaluated by [7]
Rs =
1
2 ln 2
[
ln(1 + γD)− ln(1 + γR)
]+
. (11)
By substituting λ = 0 into (6), (7) and formulating (11),
we find Rs = 0. Since our goal is to distribute the power
optimally between S and D, a non-negative secrecy rate is
achievable.As such, the operator [·]+ in (11) can be dropped
and the instantaneous secrecy rate can be reformulated as [15]
Rs =
1
2 ln 2
[
ln(1 + γD)− ln(1 + γR)
]
. (12)
Given that log(·) is monotonically increasing, the maximiza-
tion of Rs is equivalent to the maximization of
φ(λ) ∆=
1 + γD
1 + γR
. (13)
Therefore, the OPA factor λ can be obtained by solving the
following constrained optimization problem
λ = argmax
{
φ(λ)
}
s.t. 0 < λ ≤ 1 (14)
Lemma 1: f(x) is a quasi-concave function in R, if and
only if [34, Sec. 3.4.3]
∂f(x)
∂x
= 0 ⇒ ∂
2f(x)
∂x2
≤ 0. (15)
Based on lemma 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: f(x) is a quasi-concave function in
x ∈ [x1, x2], if ∂f(x)∂x |x=x1 > 0, ∂f(x)∂x |x=x2 < 0 and
there is only one maximum over [x1, x2] (despite constant
functions).
Proposition 1: φ(λ) is a quasiconcave function of λ in the
feasible set 0 < λ ≤ 1 and the optimal point is given by
λE =



bLdL(cL−aL)+
√
−aLbLcLdL(bL−dL)(aLdL−bLcL−bL+dL)
aLbL(cL+1)−cLdL(aL+1) ;
DL
1−
√
aS(cS+1)(bS+cS+1)
bScS
;
UL
(16)
Proof: The first-order derivative of φ(λ) on λ is given by
∂φ(λ)
∂λ
=



ALλ
2 + BLλ + CL
[(aL + 1)λ + bL]2[λ + dL]2
; DL
ASλ
2 + BSλ + CS
[1 + (aL − 1)λ]2[λ + cL]2 ; UL
, (17)
where AL = −aLbL(cL + 1) + cLdL(aL + 1),
BL = −2bLdL(aL−cL), CL = −aLbL dL2+bL2cL dL, AS =
(−bL (aL − 1) cL − aL (bL + 1)), BS = −2 cL (aL + bL)
and CS = −aLcL2 + bLcL. As can be seen from (17),
∂φ(λ)
∂λ = 0 leads to two solutions on λ. It is easy to examine
that the feasible solution for practical values of kti and kri [20]
are derived as (16). According to Corollary 1, we find that
φ(λ) is a quasiconcave function in the feasible set.
To make the further analysis tractable, we provide new
compact expressions for the OPA in the high SNR regime.
Accordingly, the expressions in (10) are simplified to
aL =
1
ξ1−1 , bL =
τ1
(ξ1 − 1)ν , cL =
1
τ2
, dL =
τ3
τ2ν
, (18)
By substituting (18) into (16), the OPA solution in the high
SNR regime can be expressed in the following tractable form
λHigh =



θL
ν
; DL
1− θSν; UL
(19)
where θL =
√
τ3
τ2
(τ1 − τ3)+ τ3τ2 (ξ1−1)−τ3 and θS =
√
1+τ2
ξ1
.
The result in (19) states that for DL scenario with ν  1, most
of the total power P should be allocated to the destination for
jamming signal transmission while the remaining of the power
is dedicated to the source for signal transmission. For UL
scenario with ν  1, the opposite power allocation strategy
holds true. In practice, the proposed power allocation strategy
in (19) for DL scenario can be implemented as follows:
Before data transmission, the relay is scheduled to transmit
pilot symbols [28]. Using the pilots, the source and the
destination can estimate their corresponding channels. Then
the destination sends pilot symbols to estimate the destination-
to-relay link. The relay forwards a quantized version of the
estimated destination-to-relay channel to the source. After-
ward, the source evaluates the OPA factor λ∗ based on (19) and
then transmits the OPA factor to the destination. Finally, both
the source and destination tune their transmit power to start
communication. For the UL, the proposed power allocation
strategy can be implemented the same as the DL.
IV. ERGODIC SECRECY RATE
In this section, we derive the ESR of the proposed secure
transmission scheme in each case of DL and UL scenarios.
Since it is not straightforward to obtain a closed-form expres-
sion for the exact ESR of DL and UL scenarios (the exact ESR
includes double integral expressions due to the complicated
structures of (16)), we therefore proceed by first deriving new
analytical expressions for the ESR in the high SNR regime that
can be applied to arbitrary channel fading distributions. Based
on these, new closed-form expressions are derived for the
ESR in Rayleigh fading channels. Despite prior works in the
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literature [12]–[19] that investigated the ESR based on perfect
hardware assumption in various untrusted relaying networks,
we take into account hardware imperfections. The new results
in this section generalize the recent results in [13].
The ESR as a useful secrecy metric representing the rate
below which any average secure transmission rate is achiev-
able [2]. Accordingly, using Eq. (12), the ESR expression is
given by
Rs = E
{
Rs
}
=
1
2 ln 2
[
E
{
ln(1 + γD)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
−E
{
ln(1 + γR)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
]
.
(20)
In the following, we proceed to evaluate the parts T1 and T2
and then Rs for DL scenario. Towards this goal, we present
the following useful lemma.
Lemma 2: For positive constants α1, α2 and α3, and non-
negative r.v. Γ, the cdf of the new r.v. Γ̂ = α1Γα2Γ+α3 is derived
as
F
 Γ(x) =
{
FΓ
(
α3x
α1−α2x
)
; 0 ≤ x < α1α2
1; x ≥ α1α2
(21)
Proof: We start from the definition of the cdf as follows
F
 Γ(x) = Pr
{ α1Γ
α2Γ + α3
≤ x
}
= Pr
{
Γ(α1 − α2x) ≤ α3x
}
,
(22)
where the last probability equals to one for α1 − α2 x < 0.
Otherwise, it equals to FΓ
(
α3 x
α1−α2 x
)
.
By substituting (19) into (9), we obtain
γR =
θL
θL(ξ1 − 1) + τ1 , γD =
θLγrd
(τ2θL + τ3)γrd + ξ1θL + τ4
.
(23)
We find that all the terms in (23) are deterministic constants
which leads to the secrecy rate ceiling in the high SNR regime.
Using lemma 2 and γD in (23), the part T1 in (20) is given
by
T1 = E
{
ln
(
1 +
θLγrd
(τ2θL + τ3)γrd + ξ1θL + τ4
)}
=
∫ θL
τ2θL+τ3
0
1− Fγrd
(
(ξ1θL+τ4)x
θL−(τ2θL+τ3)x
)
1 + x
dx, (24)
where the last equation follows from the integration by parts.
The expression in (24) is straightforwardly evaluated for any
channel fading distribution, either directly or by a simple
numerical integration.
Furthermore, based on γR in (23), the part T2 is a constant
value as
T2 = ln
(
1 +
θL
θL(ξ1 − 1) + τ1
)
. (25)
We conclude from (25) that the amount of information leakage
is independent of the transmit SNR and the position of the
relay, and only depends on the EVMs at network nodes.
By substituting (24) and (25) into (20), the compact ESR
expression is achieved for any channel distribution.
For the case of Rayleigh fading, due to the fact that γrd is
an exponential r.v. and applying [29, eq. (4.337.2)], the part T1
can be expressed in a closed-form solution. By substituting this
and (25) into (20), the closed-form ESR expression becomes
Rs
DL
=
1
2 ln 2
[
e
1
r2γrd Ei(− 1
r2γrd
)− e 1r1γrd Ei(− 1
r1γrd
)
− ln
(
1 +
θL
θL(ξ1 − 1) + τ1
)]
, (26)
where r1 = (1+τ2)θL+τ3ξ1θL+τ4 and r2 =
τ2θL+τ3
ξ1θL+τ4
. We conclude
from (26) that the ESR is exclusively characterized by the level
of imperfections over nodes and γrd which is a function of
the transmit SNR and the distance-dependent channel gain µrd.
We also find that increasing the number of antennas at S has
no impact on the ESR when Ns is large.
For the UL scenario, we can obtain
γR =
λHν
(1− λH)ξ1
≈ 1√
ξ1(1 + τ2)
,
γD ≈ γsr
τ2(1 +
√
1+τ2
ξ1
)γsr + ξ2 − ξ1
. (27)
Following the similar procedure as the DL scenario, the ESR
performance of the UL case for arbitrary fading distribution
can be obtained. For the case of Rayleigh fading, the closed-
form ESR expression is given by
Rs
UL
=
1
2 ln 2
[
e
1
t2γsr Ei(− 1
t2γsr
)− e 1t1γsr Ei(− 1
t1γsr
)
− ln
(
1 +
1√
ξ1(1 + τ2)
)]
, (28)
where t1 =
1+τ2(1+

1+τ2
ξ1
)
ξ2−ξ1 and t2 =
τ2(1+

1+τ2
ξ1
)
ξ2−ξ1 . It is
observed from (28) that the ESR is entirely determined by
the average channel gain of the first hop, the transmit SNR
and the level of imperfections of all the network nodes.
V. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, similar to our ESR results, general expres-
sions are first presented for the SOP that can be applied to
any channel distribution, under the presence of transceiver
imperfections and in the high SNR regime. Based on these,
we derive novel closed-form expressions for the SOP in
Rayleigh fading channels.
The SOP denoted by Pso is a criterion that determines the
fraction of fading realizations where a secrecy rate Rt cannot
be supported [11]. Accordingly, the overall SOP is defined as
the probability that a system with the instantaneous secrecy
rate Rs is not able to support the target transmission rate Rt;
Pso = Pr
{
Rs < Rt
}
.
By substituting (23) into (12) and then based on the SOP
definition, the SOP for DL scenario is evaluated by
PDLso = Pr
( θLγrd
(τ2θL + τ3)γrd + ξ1θL + τ4
≤ R˜t
)
=


Fγrd
(
(ξ1θL+τ4)Rt
θL−(τ2θL+τ3)Rt
)
; Rt< 12 log2
(
1+
θL
τ2θL+τ3
1+γR
)
1; Rt≥ 12 log2
(
1+
θL
τ2θL+τ3
1+γR
)
(29)
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where R˜t = 22Rt(1 + γR)− 1 and γR is in (23), and the last
equation follows from using lemma 2. It is worth pointing out
that the SOP expressions in (29) allows the straightforward
evaluation of the SOP for any channel fading distribution by
a simple numerical integration. We can conclude from (29)
that the SOP is always 1 for target transmission rates more
than a threshold (which only depends on the EVMs of the
nodes). Interestingly, this event holds for any channel fading
distribution, any network topology and any transmit SNR.
Therefore as explained in Section IV, some secrecy rates can
never be achieved due to secrecy rate ceiling. Furthermore,
we conclude that for target transmission rates smaller than the
threshold, Pso approaches zero with increasing SNR (similar
to perfect hardware) whereas the SOP always equals one for
target transmission rates larger than the threshold. This result
is fundamentally different to the perfect hardware case where
the SOP goes to zero with increasing SNR and for any target
transmission rate [11], [13], [15].
For Rayleigh fading channels, γrd is an exponential r.v. and
therefore, our new and simple closed-form SOP expression in
the presence of transceiver hardware imperfection is given by
PDLso =



1− exp
(
− (ξ1θL+τ4)Rt
(θL−(τ2θL+τ3)Rt)γrd
)
; Rt < R̂t
DL
1; Rt ≥ R̂t
DL
,
(30)
where R̂t
DL
= 12 [log2(1 +
θL
τ2θL+τ3
)−log2(1 + γR)]. We note
that the results of this section generalize the results of [13]
which were derived for the case of untrusted relaying with
perfect hardware.
For the UL scenario, the SOP can be obtained using
the same approach of DL scenario. For the special case of
Rayleigh fading channels, the closed-form SOP expression is
derived as
PULso =



1− exp
(
−(ξ2−ξ1)Rt
(1−τ2(1+

1+τ2
ξ1
)Rt)γsr
)
; Rt < R̂t
UL
1; Rt ≥ R̂t
UL
,
(31)
where R˜t = 22Rt(1 + γR) − 1, γR is in (27) and R̂t
UL
=
1
2 [log2(1 +
1
τ2(1+

1+τ2
ξ1
)
)− log2(1 + γR)]. As observed in the
numerical results, the closed-form expressions (30) and (31)
are sufficiently tight at medium and high transmit SNRs.
VI. HARDWARE DESIGN
In this section, we take into account the hardware design
in untrusted relaying networks with the goal of maximizing
the achievable secrecy rate. We note that in some wireless
communication networks including networks with finite delay
constraints [11], the SOP is a more meaningful performance
metric rather than the ESR. Therefore, the hardware design
problem can be formulated based on minimizing the overall
SOP which is left for future work. Toward our goad, we opti-
mally distribute the total tolerable hardware impairments of
each node, kti + kri = ktotali for i ∈ {S,R,D}, between
the RF transmission and RF reception of the same node.
From an engineering perspective, depending on the specified
cost of each network node, we show how the RF segments
at the transmission and reception front ends of each node
should be designed to achieve our goal. Accordingly, we derive
new analytical results characterizing how the hardware imper-
fections should be distributed between the transmission RF
segment and the reception RF segment of each node. We note
that the severity of the imperfection depends on the quality
of the hardwares used in the RF transceivers which can be
considered before setting up the system. Therefore, we should
find kti and kri to maximize the secrecy rate such that
kti + k
r
i = k
tot
i . Mathematically speaking, our goal is to solve
the following optimization problem
(ktR, k
r
R, k
t
D, k
r
D) = arg maxφ(λ
)
s.t. ktR + k
r
R = k
tot
R
ktD + k
r
D = k
tot
D (32)
Based on (23), (27) and (12), the instantaneous secrecy rate is
an increasing function of the transmit SNR. Since it is our aim
to achieve high transmission rates, we consider the asymptotic
SNR regime ρ → ∞ [20] to solve the hardware design
problem (32). As observed in numerical studies, the results
of the high SNR analysis can be applied successfully at finite
SNRs.
In the asymptotic SNR regime and for any random distri-
butions on γsr and γrd, the asymptotic received SNDRs at R
and D are respectively, given by
γ∞R =



θL
θL(ξ1 − 1) + τ1 ; DL
1√
ξ1(1 + τ2)
; UL,
(33)
and
γ∞D =



θL
τ2θL + τ3
; DL
1
τ2(1 +
√
1+τ2
ξ1
)
; UL.
(34)
By substituting (33) and (34) into (13), the secrecy rate ceiling
is given by
φ∞ =



((1 + τ2)θL + τ3)((ξ1 − 1)θL + τ1)
(ξ1θL + τ1)(τ2θL + τ3)
; DL
√
ξ1(τ2 + 1)
(
τ2 +
√
ξ1
√
τ2 + 1
)
τ2
(√
ξ1 +
√
τ2 + 1
) (√
ξ1
√
τ2 + 1 + 1
) ; UL
(35)
Some conclusions and insights can be concluded from (35).
First, the secrecy rate ceiling event appears in the asymptotic
SNR regime, which significantly limits the performance of the
system. This event is different from the perfect hardware case,
in which the ESR increases with increasing SNR. Note that
this ceiling effect is independent of the fading distribution.
In the following, we focus on the of DL and UL scenarios
separately and then conclude about the hardware design of the
overall network.
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A. Downlink Scenario
In the following, we proceed to solve the optimization
problem (32) by independently discussing on the hardware
design at R and D as follows.
Proposition 2: Suppose ktR + krR = ktotR , hence the secrecy
rate ceiling is maximized if ktR = krR =
ktotR
2 .
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
Proposition 3: Suppose ktD + krD = ktotD , thus the secrecy
rate ceiling is maximized if
ktD
=
2k2R+2k
tot
D
2+3−
√
4k4R+8k
2
Rk
tot
D
2+4ktotD
4+12k2R−4ktotD 2+9
4ktotD
.
(36)
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
B. Uplink Scenario
Similar to DL scenario, two propositions are provided as
follows.
Proposition 4: Suppose ktR + krR = ktotR , thus the secrecy
rate ceiling is maximized if ktR = krR =
ktotR
2 .
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
Proposition 5: Suppose ktD + krD = ktotD , hence the secrecy
rate ceiling is a monotonically decreasing function of krD.
Proof: In this case, we have
∂φ∞
∂krD
=
∂φ∞
∂τ2
∂τ2
∂krD
, (37)
where ∂τ2∂krD = 2k
r
R
2krD+2 k
r
D > 0 and
∂φ∞
∂τ2
in (57) is negative
in the feasible set. As such, ∂φ
∞
∂krD
< 0.
Based on Propositions 2–5, we provide the following corol-
lary as a conclusion of the analysis which provides new
insights into the system design.
Corollary 2: Consider a cooperative network in which one
multiple-antennas node communicates with a single-antenna
node via a single-antenna untrusted relay. Let us assume a
predefined cost can be assigned to each node. To maximize
the secrecy rate of this network the following considerations
should be taken into account:
• According to Propositions 2 and 4, the total cost for
the relay node should be divided by half between
the transmission and reception RF front ends, i.e., it
is better to apply the same level of imperfections at
every transceiver chain, instead of utilizing a mix of
high-quality and low-quality transceiver chains.
• According to Proposition 5, to design the multiple-
antennas node, the designers are persuaded to use
higher-quality hardware in reception RF front end and
lower-quality hardware in the transmission RF front end,
i.e, the hardware imperfections at the reception end of
the multiple-antennas node should be close to zero.
• According to Proposition 3, to design the single-antenna
node, the quality of RF requirements at the transmission
end should obeys from (36). As observed in the
numerical examples, we obtain ktD >
ktotD
2 for typical
values of EVMs.
Fig. 2. Ergodic secrecy rate versus transmit SNR for exact and the derived
closed-form expressions under perfect and imperfect transceiver hardwares.
Number of antennas at source or destination is set to 16. For imperfect case
with k = 0.1, the secrecy rate ceiling is observed.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, numerical results are provided to verify the
accuracy of the derived closed-form expressions in Section IV
and V for LSMA at S (LSMA-S) and LSMA at D (LSMA-D),
respectively, and also the cases of multiple-antennas at
S (MA-S) and multiple-antennas at D (MA-D). We compare
our LSMA-based ESR performance with the exact ESR
with Monte-Carlo simulations where the OPA is numerically
evaluated for finite numbers of antennas using the bisection
method. In addition, the equal power allocation (EPA)
between S and D (i.e., λ = 0.5) is plotted as a benchmark.
Furthermore, the concepts of secrecy rate ceiling and the
practical hardware insights from Section VI are numerically
presented. In our numerical evaluations, the transmission links
between nodes are modeled by the Rayleigh fading channel
and the average channel gains are specified as µsr = µrd = 10.
Moreover, for LSMA the number of antennas is set to 16,
and for MA the number of antennas is set to 4.
Fig. 2 depicts the ESR versus transmit SNR ρ in dB for
both cases of DL and UL and for perfect (k = ktR = krR =
ktS = k
t
D = k
r
D = 0) and imperfect (k = 0.1) cases. The
number of antennas at S and D are set to Ns = Nd = 16. It is
observed from the figure that the Monte-Carlo simulation of
the exact OPA evaluated using the bisection method is in good
agreement with the derived high SNR closed-form solutions
in (26) and (28) for both perfect and imperfect hardwares.
In contrast to perfect hardware, the figure shows that the
ESR ceiling phenomenon occurs for imperfect hardware which
reveals the performance limits of hardware-constrained realis-
tic networks in the high SNR regime. This figure also reveals
that hardware imperfections have low impact at low SNRs,
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Fig. 3. Ergodic secrecy rate versus transmit SNR for exact and the derived
closed-form expressions under different levels of hardware imperfections;
k ∈ {0.05, 0.1}. Number of antennas at source or destination is set to 4.
but are significant in the high SNR regime. Furthermore,
it is observed that the proposed OPA increases the secrecy
rate floor by approximately 1 bits/s/Hz and 0.9 bits/s/Hz for
DL and UL scenarios, respectively compared to the EPA
(λ = 0.5).
In Fig. 3, we examine the accuracy of the derived closed-
form solutions for MA-S and MA-D by considering Ns =
Nd = 4. As can be seen, the numerical and the theoretical
curves are in good agreement across all SNR regimes. More-
over, it is observed that by increasing the level of hardware
imperfections from k = 0.05 to k = 0.1, the achievable
secrecy rate is degraded approximately 1 bits/s/Hz in the high
SNR regime.
Figs. 4 and 5 show the SOP as a function of the transmit
SNR for LSMA based DL and UL scenarios, respectively, and
for different target secrecy rates. The theoretical curves were
plotted by the derived analytical expressions in (30) and (31)
which are well-tight with the marker symbols generated by
the Monte-Carlo simulations. As observed from these fig-
ures, there is only a negligible performance loss caused by
transceiver hardware imperfections in the low target secrecy
rate of Rt = 0.25 bits/s/Hz, but by increasing the target
secrecy rate to Rt = 1 bits/s/Hz or Rt = 2 bits/s/Hz,
substantial performance loss is revealed. Interestingly, for
Rt = 2 bits/s/Hz, the network with imperfect hardware is
always in outage and secure communications is unattainable-
irrespective of the transmit SNR. This is exactly predicted by
our analytical results in section V. The reason is that this
target secrecy rate is more than the derived thresholds in
(30) and (31), and as mentioned, the SOP of the system always
equals one for Rt more the thresholds. It can also be seen from
the figures that despite the OPA technique that the SOP curves
with imperfect hardware and with perfect hardware have the
Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability versus transmit SNR for DL transmission,
with different target transmission rates and under perfect (k = 0) and
imperfect hardware (k = 0.1).
Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus transmit SNR for UL transmission,
with different target transmission rates and under perfect (k = 0) and
imperfect hardware (k = 0.1).
same slope (and thus, hardware imperfections lead to only an
SNR offset which is unveiled as a curve shifting to the right),
the SOP performance of the EPA technique approaches a non-
zero saturation value in the high SNR regime for imperfect
hardware. This observation reveals the secrecy performance
advantage of the proposed OPA scheme compared with EPA.
Finally, we provide Figs. 6 and 7 to illustrate the insights for
designing practical systems that were presented in Section VI.
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Fig. 6. Ergodic secrecy rate versus transmit SNR for LSMA at S.
Various imperfection distributions over RF transmission and reception ends
are considered for ktotR = ktotD = 0.2.
Fig. 7. Ergodic secrecy rate versus transmit SNR for LSMA at D.
Various imperfection distributions over RF transmission and reception ends
are considered for ktotR = ktotD = 0.2.
In the simulation, we assume that the total hardware imper-
fection over each node equals to 0.2, i.e., ktotR = ktotD = 0.2.
Based on Propositions 2 and 4, to maximize the secrecy rate,
we should design the transmission and reception RF front ends
at R such that ktR = krR = 0.1. For LSMA at S, based on
Proposition 3, we obtain ktD = 0.13 and krD = 0.07 while for
LSMA at D and based on Proposition 5, we should design
the hardwares such that ktD = 0.2 and krD = 0. By defining
the hardware imperfection vector as IV = [ktR, krR, ktD, krD],
we consider the following four different hardware design
schemes:
• Design 1: R and D are designed randomly, for example
IV = [0.15, 0.05, 0.1, 0.1],
• Design 2: R is designed optimally based on Propo-
sitions 2 and 4 while D is designed randomly;
IV = [0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1],
• Design 3: R is designed randomly while D is designed
optimally; For LSMA at S, IV = [0.15, 0.05, 0.13, 0.07]
and for LSMA at D, IV = [0.15, 0.05, 0.2, 0], and
• Design 4: R and D are designed optimally; For LSMA
at S, IV = [0.1, 0.1, 0.13, 0.07] and for LSMA at D,
IV = [0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0].
The results depict that the hardware design 4 which is
based on Propositions 2-5 provides higher ESR performance
compared to the case of random hardware design (Design 1)
and the cases of optimizing only one node (Designs 2 and 3).
Furthermore, they show that the analysis presented in
Section VI (which was based on high SNR analysis), can be
utilized auspiciously at medium SNRs. In addition, as can
be seen from these figures and mentioned before, different
hardware designs have the ESR performance close together
at low SNR regime, while the difference between the ESR
performance of the designs is large at high SNR regime.
Finally, we can understand from the figure that the proposed
OPA together with Design 4 significantly outperforms the
scenario of EPA with Design 4.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Physical radio-frequency (RF) transceivers are insepara-
ble segments in both traditional and new emerging wireless
networks. In the literature, very few works have consid-
ered the impact of hardware imperfections on security based
transmissions and little is understood regarding this impact
on untrusted relaying networks. In this paper, by taking
hardware imperfections into consideration, we proposed an
optimal power allocation (OPA) strategy to maximize the
instantaneous secrecy rate of a cooperative wireless net-
work comprised of a source, a destination and an untrusted
amplify-and-forward (AF) relay. Based on our OPA solutions,
new closed-form expressions were derived for the ergodic
secrecy rate (ESR) and secrecy outage probability (SOP)
with Rayleigh fading channels. The expressions effectively
characterize the impact of hardware imperfections and man-
ifest the existence of a secrecy rate ceiling that cannot be
enhanced by increasing SNR or improving fading conditions.
They also illustrate that hardware imperfections have low
impact at low SNRs, but are significant in the high SNR
regime. This issue reveals that hardware imperfections should
be taken into account when developing high rate systems
such as LTE-Advanced and 5G networks. To improve the
secrecy performance of the network, we finally presented
the hardware design approach. Numerical results depict that
optimally distributing the hardware imperfections between the
transmission and reception RF segments can further improve
the secrecy performance.
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APPENDIX A
Let take the first-order derivative of φ∞ on ktR using the
chain rule in partial derivations as follows
∂φ∞
∂ktR
=
∂φ∞
∂θL
(∂θL
∂τ1
∂τ1
∂ktR
+
∂θL
∂τ2
∂τ2
∂ktR
+
∂θL
∂τ3
∂τ3
∂ktR
+
∂θL
∂ξ1
∂ξ1
∂ktR
)
+
∂φ∞
∂τ1
∂τ1
∂ktR
+
∂φ∞
∂τ2
∂τ2
∂ktR
+
∂φ∞
∂τ3
∂τ3
∂ktR
+
∂φ∞
∂ξ1
∂ξ1
∂ktR
,
(38)
where using (35), we obtain
∂φ∞
∂θL
=
κ1θL
2 + κ2θL + κ3
(θLξ1 + τ1)2(τ2θL + τ3)2
, (39)
∂θL
∂τ1
=
τ3
2
√
τ2τ3 (τ1 − τ3)
, (40)
∂θL
∂τ2
= −
√
τ3(τ1 − τ3)
2τ2
√
τ2
− τ3(ξ1 − 1)
τ22
, (41)
∂θL
∂τ3
=
τ1 − 2τ3
2
√
τ2τ3(τ1 − τ3)
+
ξ1 − 1
τ2
− 1, (42)
∂θL
∂ξ1
=
τ3
τ2
, (43)
∂φ∞
∂τ1
=
θL (τ2θL + τ3 + θL)
(θLξ1 + τ1)2 (τ2θL + τ3)
, (44)
∂φ∞
∂τ2
= − θ
2
L(ξ1θL + τ1 − θL)
(τ2θL + τ3)2(ξ1θL + τ1)
, (45)
∂φ∞
∂τ3
= − θL(ξ1θL + τ1 − θL)
(τ2θL + τ3)2(ξ1θL + τ1)
, (46)
∂φ∞
∂ξ1
=
θ2L(τ2θL + τ3 + θL)
(ξ1θL + τ1)2(τ2θL + τ3)
, (47)
where κ1 = −τ1τ2(τ2 +1)+ τ3ξ1(ξ1− 1), κ2 = −2τ1τ3(τ2−
ξ1+1) and κ3 = τ1τ3(τ1−τ3). By substituting krR = ktotR −ktR
into (35), we obtain
∂τ1
∂ktR
= −2ktotR + 2ktR, (48)
∂τ2
∂ktR
= −2krD2(ktotR − ktR)− 2(ktotR − ktR)ktR2
+2(ktotR − ktR)2ktR + 4ktR − 2ktotR , (49)
∂τ3
∂ktR
= −2krD2(ktotR − ktR)− 2(ktotR − ktR)ktR2
+2(ktotR − ktR)2ktR + 4ktR − 2ktotR + 2 ktRktD2,
(50)
∂ξ1
∂ktR
= −2ktotR + 2ktR. (51)
Substituting (39)–(51) into (38) and after tedious manipula-
tions yields
∂φ∞
∂ktR
=
4(1− krD2)(ktotR − 2 ktR)(
4ktR
2 − 4 ktRktotR + 2ktotR 2 + 2krD2 + ktD2
)2 . (52)
Expression (52) shows that φ∞ is a concave function of ktR
in the feasible set and ktR =
ktotR
2 is the single solution to
∂φ∞
∂ktR
= 0.
APPENDIX B
Following the similar approach in Proposition 2, we should
evaluate ∂φ
∞
∂ktD
. Let substitute krD = ktotD − ktD into τ1, τ2, τ3
and then compute the following derivations
∂τ1
∂ktD
= 1, ∂τ2
∂ktD
= −2krR2(ktotD − ktD)− 2ktotD + 2ktD,
(53)
∂τ3
∂ktD
= −2krR2(ktotD − ktD)− 2ktotD + 2ktD + 2ktD(ktR2 + 1)
+2ktD(k
tot
D − ktD)2 − 2ktD2(ktotD − ktD). (54)
The expression ∂φ
∞
∂ktD
can be obtained similar to (38) by
changing ktR to ktD. Then by substituting (39)–(47) and (53),
(54) into ∂φ∞∂ktD , and after manipulations, we obtain
∂φ∞
∂ktD
= −
2
(
2k2R k
t
D−2ktD2ktotD +2 ktDktotD 2+3ktD−2ktotD
)
(
2k2R+3k
t
D
2−4ktDktotD +2ktotD 2
)2 .
(55)
It is easy to see that (55) is a concave function of ktD and the
single solution to ∂φ
∞
∂ktD
= 0 is simply calculated.
APPENDIX C
We can write
∂φ∞
∂krR
=
∂φ∞
∂τ2
∂τ2
∂krR
+
∂φ∞
∂ξ1
∂ξ1
∂krR
. (56)
Using (35) yields (57) and (58), as shown at the bottom of
this page.
Considering ktR = ktotR − krR, one can obtain
∂τ2
∂krR
= 4krR
3 − 6krR2ktotR + (2krD2 + 2ktotR 2 + 4)krR − 2ktotR ,
(59)
∂ξ1
∂krR
= 2krR. (60)
By substituting (57)–(60) into (56) and solving ∂φ∞∂krR = 0
yields krR =
ktotR
2 .
∂φ∞
∂τ2
= −
ξ1
[
(2 (τ2 + 2) ξ1 − τ22)
√
ξ1(1 + τ2) + 2ξ1(τ2(ξ1 + 1− τ2) + ξ1 + 1)
]
2τ22
(√
ξ1
√
1 + τ2 + 1
)2 (
ξ1 +
√
ξ1
√
1 + τ2
)2 , (57)
∂φ∞
∂ξ1
=
(1 + τ2)
[
(τ2 + 2ξ1)
√
ξ1(1 + τ2) + 2 (1 + τ2) ξ1
]
2τ2
(√
ξ1
√
1 + τ2 + 1
)2 (
ξ1 +
√
ξ1
√
1 + τ2
)2 . (58)
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